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COURTROOM CLOSURE AND THE RIGHTS
OF THE FREE PRESS
Although the open courtroom is an integral part of the American
criminal justice system,' trial courts recently began to restrict access to
the public and the press.2 In 1979 the Supreme Court in Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale sanctioned the exclusion of press and public from a pre-
trial hearing? This ruling severely debilitated the traditional public
trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment.' Trial judges across the
United States closed their doors at all stages of criminal proceedings.'
1. See. e.g.. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948) ("Counsel have not cited and we have
been unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state,
or municipal court during the history of this country.") (footnote omitted); United States v. Pow-
ers, 477 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1980). See generally Radin,
The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1931); Note, The Right to a Public Trialin Criminal
Cases, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1138 (1966).
2. Landau, Fair Trail and Free Press--a Due Process Proposal- The Challenge of the Com-
mumcations Media, 62 A.B.A.J. 55 (1976). This article reflects the following data:
Closed Court or Prior Restraint on Prior Restraint
Years Closed Records Participant Statements on Publication
1967 1 2 0
1968 5 7 1
1969 1 4 1
1970 0 7 0
1971 5 6 2
1972 4 1 4
1973 8 7 4
1974 12 11 13
1975 25 18 14
Id. at 57. For more recent data on courtroom closures, see Court Watch Summary, unpublished
report compiled by the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press, Washington, D.C. (1979).
See general' Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1969); Younger, The Sheppard Mandate
Toda;: A TrialJudge's Perspective, 56 NEB. L. REv. 1, 6 (1977) (Sheppard Court "stressed that the
trial judge must take steps to protect the trial against prejudicial outside influences" (emphasis in
original)); Note, Exclusion ofthe Press and Publicfrom Pretrial Criminal Proceedings to Guarantee
Fair Trial, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 883, 884 (1979) ("The trend toward closure ... is directly attribu-
table to the increased emphasis on the trial judge's duty to protect the accused."); 47 GEO. WASH.
L REV. 319, 322 (1978).
3. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
4. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. The right to a public trial under the sixth amendment has been incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment due process clause so as to apply to the states. See, e.g., Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
5. See Court Watch Summary, unpublished report compiled by the Reporter's Committee
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These courtroom closures, coupled with frequent attacks on the rulings
by the press, perpetuated the confusion that surrounds the fair trial-free
press conflict.
In 1980 the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia at-
tempted to dispel the confusion.' In Richmond a trial judge excluded
the press and public from a two day murder trial. The Supreme- Court
held that the first and fourteenth amendments7 implicitly guarantee the
public and the press the right to attend criminal trials. Because the
Court did not overrule Gannett,' however, this attempt to resolve the
fair trial-free press conflict merely complicated the dilemma.
This Note analyzes the interests represented in this fair trial-free
press conflict. The decision to close the courtroom necessarily impli-
cates both the sixth and first amendments. This Note will explore the
resolution of the conflict in Gannett and Richmond to determine the
effects of courtroom closure.
I. COURTROOM CLOSURE PRIOR TO GANNETT
A. Sixth Amendment Rftht to a Public Trial
Traditionally, trials in America have been open to the public.9
Courts recognize that the public trial provides a forum for contempora-
neous public scrutiny of the judicial system. The public's presence at
trials restrains any attempt to utilize the courts as instruments of op-
for Freedom of the Press, Washington, D.C. (1979). Courts have closed proceedings in the follow-
ing jurisdictions: Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washing-
ton, Washington D.C., West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
6. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
7. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The freedom of
speech and press, guaranteed under the first amendment, has been incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment due process clause to apply to the states. Cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) (assumes incorporation).
8. 100 S. Ct. at 2821.
9. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a public event. What transpires
in the court room is public property."). Even when publicity has been restricted, the courts recog-
nize the public nature of a trial. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1965) (public has a
"right to be informed as to what occurs in its courts .... [R]eporters ... are always present if
they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court."). See generally
Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956); United Press Ass'n v.
Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954) (Frossel, J., dissenting); 3 J. STORY, FAMILIAR Expo-
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pression.t° The fear in America of closed trials has been imputed to the
infamous secret proceedings of the Spanish Inquisition, the English
Court of the Star Chamber, and the French Monarchy's lettre de
cachet."t  The Supreme Court stated that these institutions suppressed
"political and religious heresies in ruthless disregard of the right of an
accused to a fair trial."'12 The common law, therefore, guaranteed the
accused the right to a trial before a public forum. The sixth amend-
ment now embraces this guarantee.13
Many courts recognize that the sixth amendment does more than
simply protect the accused's right to a public trial. These courts main-
tain that the amendment also deters judicial arbitrariness,' 4 reduces the
possibility of perjury,' 5 increases the possibility of obtaining additional
evidence,' 6 and enables the public to scrutinize the judicial branch of
SITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 234 (1840); Quick, A Public Criminal Trial,
60 DICK. L. REV. 21, 29-33 (1955); Comment, 52 MICH. L. REV. 128, 128-30 (1953). See also note
24 in/ra.
10. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1969); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
539 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
11. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1948). See generally Radin, supra note 1, at 381
(suggestion that at common law "man could be spirited away from his friends, held incommuni-
cado and sentenced to death without ever facing any other person than his judges").
12. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
13. When Congress first framed the Bill of Rights, Madison proposed a provision that guar-
anteed the accused the right to a public trial. This provision became part of the sixth amendment.
F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 30 (1951).
14. Contemporaneous public review prevents abuse of judicial power by the judge or the
prosecutor. Eg.. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948); United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 921
(3d Cir. 1949); State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 85-86, 139 N.W.2d 800, 806-07 (1966); People v.
Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 62, 123 N.E.2d 769, 771-72 (1954). See generally J. BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 69 (1825); Note, supra note I, at 1139.
15. Witnesses will be less likely to perjure themselves when they know that their testimony is
being scrutinized by the public. Eg., United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606
(3d Cir. 1969) (en banc); Snyder v. Coiner, 365 F. Supp. 321, 324 (N.D.W. Va. 1973), af'd, 510
F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1975); State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 85-86, 139 N.W.2d 800, 806-07 (1966);
State v. Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250, 255, 118 A.2d 707, 709 (1955); People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56,
62-63, 123 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1954). See generally J. BENTHAM, supra note 14, at 68; Note, supra
note 1, at 1139 ("[tlearing contradiction ... a witness may prefer to testify truthfully").
16. Key witnesses, unknown to the litigating parties, may come forward with important testi-
mony. E.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948); United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835,
850 (3d Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 1969) (en
banc); United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949); Tanksley v. United States, 145
F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944); Snyder v. Coiner, 365 F. Supp. 321, 324 (N.D.W. Va. 1973), ajf'd, 510
F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1975); State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 87, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (1966); People v.
Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 63, 123 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1954). See generally J. BENTHAM, supra note 14; 6 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1834, at 436-38 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976);
Note, supra note 1, at 1139.
Washington University Open Scholarship
948 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 58:945
government.17 Thus, courts often construe the sixth amendment to
serve the public interest.
Courts are fragmented over whether this public interest is sufficient
to give the public an enforceable constitutional right to attend trials.
Some courts interpret the sixth amendment public trial provision to
benefit only the accused. 18 These courts rely on the text of the sixth
amendment, which explicitly states that the accused shall enjoy the
right to a public trial.19 They recognize a strong public interest in trials,
but reject the argument that this interest has the status of a constitu-
tional right. Conversely, other courts recognize that the public's right
to be present is "as basic as that of the defendant. ' 20 The common law
supports the latter interpretation of the sixth amendment. The English
legal system required public trials even before there was any substan-
tial regard for the accused's rights.2 ' Courts also reason that the poli-
17. Eg., United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); State v. Hensley, 75 Ohio St.
255, 79 N.E. 462 (1906); Neal v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 283, 192 P.2d 294 (1948).
18. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965) ("The purpose of the [sixth amend-
ment] requirement of a public trial was to guarantee that the accused would be fairly dealt with
and not unjustly condemned."); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948) (sixth amendment
guarantees "all persons accused of crime-the innocently accused, that they may not become the
victim of an unjust prosecution, as well as the guilty, that they may be awarded a fair trial") (citing
People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 286, 50 N.W. 995, 998 (1891)); Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d
659, 660 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959) ("Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is a
right of the accused, and of the accused only"); United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723 (3d
Cir.), ceri. denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949) (defendant can waive right to public trial); United Press
Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 81, 123 N.E.2d 777, 781 (1954) ("whatever concern the public may
have for a defendant's right to a fair trial, it can seldom match that of the person whose life or
liberty is at stake"); People v. Pratt, 27 A.D.2d 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1967) (right to a public trial
personal to the accused).
19. For a discussion on the definition of "accused," see Note, The Right to Atlend Criminal
Hearings, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1308 (1978).
20. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 161, 125 N.E.2d 896, 899, appeal di&-
missed, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955) (per curiam). Accord, United States v. Cianfrani,
573 F.2d 835, 854 (3d Cir. 1978) ("strong presumption in favor of public proceedings"); United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("independent right to be present to see
that justice is fairly done"); Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ky. 1968) ("In our opinion
the question of the right of the public to attend court proceedings... is... well established"),
21. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the accused was treated in the follow-
ing manner:.
(1) The prisoner was kept in confinement more or less secret till his trial, and could not
prepare for his defense. He was examined, and his examination was taken down.
(2) He had no notice beforehand of the evidence against him, and was compelled to
defend himself as well as he could when the evidence, written or oral, was produced at
his trial. He had no counsel either before or at the trial.
(3) [TMhe witnesses were not necessarily (to say the very least) confronted with the pris-
oner, nor were the originals of documents required to be produced.
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cies underlying the sixth amendment are frequently separate from, and
even opposed to, the interests of the defendant.22 The Third Circuit
found "[tihe right thus accorded to members of the public to be present
at a criminal trial . . . has been imbedded in our Constitution as an
important safeguard not only to the accused but to the public gener-
ally."23 Courts agree, therefore, that the public has a vital interest in
open trials.24 Few courts, however, grant this interest the status of a
constitutional right.
The conflict over who benefits from the sixth amendment necessarily
leads courts to disagree over another issue: Whether the defendant can
compel a private trial. The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he ability
to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right
to insist upon the opposite of that right. 25 A majority of courts, there-
(4) It does not appear that the prisoner was allowed to call witnesses on his own behalf,
but it matters little whether he was or not; as he had no means of ascertaining what
evidence they would give, or of procuring their attendance. In later times they were not
examined on oath, if they were called.
Radin, supra note 1, at 383-84 (quoting STEPHENS, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
350 (1883)).
22. Eg., United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 852 (3d Cir. 1978). See also J. BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 576 (1827). Bentham maintained that:
[M]atters might easily be so arranged, as that the acquittal of the defendant, though
guilty, might be the result; and this without being productive of any of that disrepute,
which would naturally attach upon the conduct of the judge who should be given impu-
nity to a malefactor whose guilt was written in legible characters upon the face of the
evidence.
Id.
23. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 924 (3d Cir. 1949).
24. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Fite v. Retail Credit Co., 386 F. Supp. 1045 (D.
Mont. 1975), aft'd, 537 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. General Motors Corp., 352 F.
Supp. 1071 (E.D. Mich. 1973); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); May-
berry v. Yeager, 321 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1971); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107 Ariz.
557, 490 P.2d 563 (1971); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594
(1966) (en banc); State v. White, 97 Ariz. 196, 398 P.2d 903 (1965) (en banc); Kirstowsky v. Supe-
rior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956); Gore Newspaper Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d
777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), ree'don other grounds sub nom. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293
(Fla. 1977); Williamson v. Lacy, 86 Me. 80, 29 A. 943 (1893); Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392
(1884); Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976); E.W.
Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal disrissed, 164 Ohio St. 261, 130
N.E.2d 701 (1955) (per curiam); Newspapers, Inc. v. Circuit Court, 65 Wis. 2d 66, 221 N.W.2d 894
(1974). See generally ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE: FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, Standard 8-3.2 (approved draft 1978); Congressional Re-
search Service, The Constitution of the United States of America-Analysis and Interpretation, S.
Doc. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. amend. VI, at 1199-1200 (1973); Quick, supra note 9, at 29-33;
Note, supra note 19, at 1326 ("when taken in conjunction, [the sixth and first amendments]...
support a qualified right of attendance").
25. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965).
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fore, find that although defendants may waive their right to a public
trial,26 they do not have the concomitant right to demand a private
trial.2 7 Thus, courts disagree over whether the sixth amendment affords
the public a right to attend criminal trials but generally concur that a
defendant does not have an absolute right to a private trial, even when
the defendant believes that a secret trial would promote his best inter-
est.28
B. The Sixth Amendment v. the First Amendment
Even if there is no sixth amendment public right to attend criminal
trials, the press asserts a right to attend under the first amendment pro-
tection of the free press. The press plays a particularly important role
in the criminal justice system. The press has been both praised for en-
suring the accused a fair trial and condemned for denying him a fair
trial.29
The Supreme Court has recognized that a responsible press30 is "the
26. The defendant generally waives the right to a public trial without a timely objection. See,
e.g., United States v. Cappello, 327 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1964); People v. Cash, 52 Cal. 2d 841, 345
P.2d 462 (1959) (en banc).
27. E.g., United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 852 (3d Cir. 1978) ("defendant has no
absolute right to compel a private trial"); Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir. 1965) (no
compelled private trial because public trial provision protects "the public's right to know what
goes on when men's lives and liberty are at stake"); United States v. American Radiator & Stan-
dard San. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790, 793 (W.D. Pa.) ("Sixth amendment ... does not preserve to
[defendant] a right to a private trial"), aj'd, 388 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 922
(1968); Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ky. 1968) ("public is a party to all criminal
proceedings").
Other courts have held that the defendant can waive his right to a public trial without consider-
ation of the public's right of access to the trial. Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 368 (1949); United States v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
28. This ruling is consistent with Supreme Court sixth amendment cases. See Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (defendant cannot compel the opposite of his right to a speedy trial by
waiver); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) (defendant cannot compel bench trial by
waiving right to jury trial). But see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant granted
right of self-representation by waiving right to counsel).
29. See United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 509 (5th Cir. 1972) ("if allowing the press
to publish. . . carried the prospect of poisoning the minds of potential jurors, it likewise offered
the promise of administering an antidote against the societal diseases of corruption"); Garry &
Riordan, Gag Orders.- Cui Bono, 29 STAN. L. Rv. 575, 589-90 (1977) ("The press may be a
fickle friend of criminal defendants, helping to save some from the rope or dungeon it vociferously
urges upon others.").
30. The Supreme Court has recognized a duty on the part of the press to act responsibly. In
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart the Court ruled that:
mhe extraordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment carry with them some-
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handmaiden of effective judicial administration."'" Zealous reporting
enlightens the general public on the law and the functioning of the ju-
dicial system. Reporting also may be the only effective check on the
defendant's right to a fair trial.32 The press guards against the miscar-
riage of justice by subjecting the judiciary to intensive public scrutiny
and criticism.33 Freedom of the press thus serves a dual function: Pro-
tection of the public's right to know34 and the defendant's right to a fair
thing in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise the protected rights responsibly-a
duty widely acknowledged but not always observed by editors and publishers. It is not
asking too much to suggest that those who exercise First Amendment rights in newspa-
pers or broadcasting enterprises direct some effort to protect the rights of an accused to a
fair trial by unbiased jurors.
427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976). The American Bar Association has proposed model guidelines for the
bar and press to follow voluntarily. The suggested model sets out certain types of information that
generally should not be released. The model states:
The release and publication of certain types of information may tend to be prejudicial
without serving a significant function of law enforcement or public interest. All con-
cerned should be aware of the dangers of prejudice in making pre-trial disclosures of the
following types of information... :
(a) opinions about an accused's character, guilt or innocence;
(b) admissions, confessions or the contents of a statement attributed to the accused,
except that a lawyer may announce that the accused denies the charges against him;
(c) references to the results of any examinations or tests, such as fingerprints, poly-
graph examination, ballistics or laboratory tests;
(d) statements concerning the credibility or anticipated testimony of prospective wit-
nesses;
(e) opinions concerning evidence or argument in the case, and whether or not it is
anticipated that such evidence or argument will be used at trial; or
(f) prior criminal charges and convictions, although they usually are matters of pub-
lic record. (Their publication may be especially prejudicial immediately preceding
trial).
When a trial has begun, the news media generally may report anything done or said in
open court. They should consider very carefully, however, publication of any matter or
statement excluded from evidence outside the presence of the jury. This type of informa-
tion may be highly prejudicial, and if it reaches the jury could result in mistrial. This
precaution is especially important in instances when the jury has not been sequestered
for the duration of the trial.
ABA, LEGAL ADVISORY COMMrrTEE ON FAIR TRIA. AND FREE PRESS; FAIR TRIAL, FREE PRESS,
VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS 8 (1974).
31. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). The Court emphasized that the press'
function in the criminal justice system was "documented by an impressive record of service over
several centuries." Id.
32. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 22, at 524. Bentham stated that:
[w]ithout publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other
checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institution might pres-
ent themselves in the character of checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks
than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.
Id.
33. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
34. The public, under the first amendment, also has a right to receive information. See, e.g.,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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trial.35
Even when zealous reporting results in adverse publicity, the rights
of the accused are not necessarily jeopardized.36 The Supreme Court
has ruled that "pretrial publicity-even pervasive, adverse publicity-
does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial. ' 37  Juror exposure to de-
tailed accounts of the crime or of prior convictions will not presump-
tively deprive the defendant of a fair trial.38 Qualified jurors need not
be totally ignorant of the facts involved. A fair trial is denied only
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Linmark Assoc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). See generally Emerson, Legal Foundations of
the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Fenner & Koley, The Rights of the Press and the Closed
Court Criminal Proceeding, 57 NEB. L. REv. 442 (1978); Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977). It is also interesting to note that Justice Stewart, who wrote
the majority opinion in Gannett, has maintained that the public's right to know should not be
limited. In his dissent in Estes v. Texas he opposed barring broadcast media from the courtroom,
stating that "It]he suggestion that there are limits upon the public's right to know what goes on in
the courts causes me deep concern." 381 U.S. 532, 614-15 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting),
35. E.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965) ("History had proven that secret tribu-
nals were effective instruments of oppression."); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) ("[Tlhe
guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as
instruments of persecution."); United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 847 (3d Cir. 1978) (Anglo-
American belief that the "knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous re-
view in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse ofjudicial power.")
(quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268); United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949)
(European secret trials had been "in ruthless disregard of the right of an accused to a fair trial.")
(footnote omitted); People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 62, 123 N.E.2d 769, 771 (1954) (open judicial
proceedings afford greater security to the individual in the administration of justice).
36. Excessive publicity, causing an unfair trail, deprives the defendant of his right to due
process. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). The fifth amendment provides in perti-
nent part: "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. ... U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No
State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. See generally Landau, supra note 1, at 59 (must provide the de-
fendant "fundamental fairness").
37. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976). Accord, Murphy v. Florida, 421
U.S. 794, 799 (1975) (consider totality of circumstances to determine if trial fundamentally unfair).
Cf. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953) ("A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but
not a perfect one."). In cases where the Court has reversed the conviction the publicity has been
especially pervasive and adverse. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (intensive press
coverage at trial, turning proceeding into a "carnival"); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (dis-
ruptive press coverage at pretrial hearing, sufficient to tempt jurors to forget burden of proof
required to convict); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (television film of defendant mak-
ing in-custody confession to bank robbery, kidnapping, and murder).
38. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975).
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when jurors are inflexibly biased.39
Courts agree that closure of the courtroom is appropriate under cer-
tain circumstances.' Wide dissemination of extremely prejudicial in-
formation can jeopardize the defendant's right to a fair trial. The trial
court may control public attendance by exercising its duty to ensure a
fair and orderly trial.4 1 The court can limit public attendance to pre-
vent overcrowding because an overly large crowd may interfere with
the orderly administration of justice.42 The court can exclude persons
creating disturbances43 and order the door locked to prevent distraction
from constant movement of spectators. 44 Courts also have excluded the
public during the testimony of certain witnesses. The public is ex-
cluded when children testify to distasteful facts,45 when the presence of
spectators would endanger the safety of witnesses, 46 and when wit-
39. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961).
40. Eg. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975). See
genera/l; Note, supra note 1; Note, supra note 2.
41. The Supreme Court, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, established the trial judge's duty to protect
the defendant's right to a fair trial. In Sheppard the Court reversed Sheppard's murder conviction
because the trial judge had failed to protect the accused from pervasive prejudicial publicity. The
Court found the judge must affirmatively protect the accused's right to a fair trial. The Court
maintained that, "[gliven the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effac-
ing the prejudicial publicity from the minds of jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to
ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused." 384 U.S. at 362. The Court stressed
that the presence of the press must be limited when nec.-sary to prevent a carnival atmosphere at
trial. Id. at 358. Accord, CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d 234,241 (6th Cir. 1974) ("[A] trial judge should
have the authority to adopt reasonable measures to avoid injury to the parties by reason of preju-
dicial or inflammatory publicity."). See generally Younger, supra note 2. The trial judge sug-
gested that in dealing with publicity cases: (1) There should be a presumption of no order against
the press; (2) if an order is deemed necessary, it should be as narrow as possible; and (3) the trial
judge should concentrate on the use of intensive voir dire and jury instructions. Id. at 20-21.
42. E.g., Myers v. State, 97 Ga. 76, 98-99, 25 S.E. 252, 260 (1895); Tate v. Commonwealth,
258 Ky. 685, 693, 80 S.W.2d 817, 821 (1935); State v. Saale, 308 Mo. 573, 579-81, 274 S.W. 393,
395-96 (1925); People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 60-61, 177 N.E. 306, 308 (1931). Seealso Bishop v.
State, 19 Ala. App. 326, 97 So. 169 (1923); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 239, 252-55, 38
S.W. 422, 424-25 (1896).
43. Eg., Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967, 971-72 (2d Cir. 1965); State v. Copp, 15 N.H. 212,
214-15 (1844); State v. Genese, 102 N.J.L. 134, 142, 130 A. 642, 646 (1925); Grimmett v. State, 22
Tex. Crim. 36, 40, 2 S.W. 631, 633 (1886).
44. E.g., Bishop v. State, 19 Ala. App. 326, 97 So. 169 (1923); People v. Buck, 46 Cal. App. 2d
558, 116 P.2d 160 (1941).
45. Eg., Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935); Beuchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky.
505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944); State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933), qldon rehearing, 64
S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936); Grimmett v. State, 22 Tex. Crim. 36, 2 S.W. 631 (1886).
46. E.g., Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2nd Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); People
v. Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d 71, 286 N.E.2d 265, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1972), cer. denied, 410 U.S. 911
(1973).
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nesses would be embarrassed or reluctant to testify.47 The court may
exclude at least some members of the public when evidence is expected
to be obscene.48 Clearly, therefore, a trial is not absolutely a public
event.
The first amendment commands that the press be allowed to freely
gather and publish the news; 49 the sixth amendment demands the ac-
cused be tried before an impartial jury."0 The Supreme Court, when
faced with this conflict, has engaged in a balancing5' of the first and
sixth amendment interests.52 In determining the weight to be given the
first amendment, the Court has distinguished between the media's right
to publish and its right to gather information. The Court has found
that the first amendment affords a special protection against orders that
impose a prior restraint on speech. A prior restraint is a court order
that forbids publication of material in the media's possession.53 Any
system of prior restraint comes to the Court with a "heavy presumption
47. E.g., Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 818 (1969); Geise v.
United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); State v. Callahan,
100 Minn. 63, 110 N.W. 342 (1907).
48. E.g., United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 922 (3d Cir. 1949); State v. Croak, 167 La. 92,
118 So. 703 (1928).
49. See note 7 supra.
50. See note 4 supra.
51. That one constitutionally amendment should not have absolute priority over another has
long been recognized. Justice Frankfurter, in Pennekamp v. Florida, maintained:
A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judi-
ciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other;, bath are indispensable to a free
society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through
which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for
assuring judges their independence is a free press.
328 U.S. 331, 355 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Because of the unwillingness to set an
absolute priority, the Court has engaged in a balancing of interests. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Justice Douglas, however, disagreed with
any balancing of the first amendment. He maintained "that all of the 'balancing' was done by
those who wrote the Bill of Rights. By casting the First Amendment in absolute terms, they
repudiated the timid, watered-down, emasculated versions of the First Amendment .. . ad-
vance[d]." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
52. In determining any balance between the sixth and first amendments, the Court must con-
sider the policies underlying the two amendments. The first amendment's protection of free
speech and press promotes public knowledge and awareness. The sixth amendment guarantees
the accused a fair, open trial. These two policies are often complementary. Just as the norm of a
public trial promotes public awareness, public awareness ensures the accused a fair trial. See
generally Note, s.rpra note 19, at 1326.
53. See generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648
(1955).
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against its constitutional validity." 54 Courts are extremely reluctant to
uphold prior restraints on publication." A first amendment right to
gather information, however, is not uniformly upheld. 6 Many courts
hold that the government has no duty to provide access to the press. 7
54. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976). In Nebraska Press a unanimous
Court struck down a court order prohibiting the press from publishing confessions, admissions, or
other inculpatory information. The accused was charged with the brutal murder of six members
of a Nebraska family. The crime attracted widespread publicity including incriminating state-
ments made by the accused. The trial judge concluded that an impartial jury would be difficult to
impanel if the press were not restrained. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found the prior re-
straint invalid. Id. at 570. The constitutional presumption of invalidity was not rebutted because
the trial judge's conclusion as to the publicity "was of necessity speculative, dealing ... with
factors unknown and unknowable." Id. at 563. The Court also found that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that (1) there were no less restrictive alternatives, or (2) a prior restraint would
be effective. Id. at 563-67. The Court refused, however, to bar absolutely the use of prior re-
straints in all situations. Id. at 563-70. See generally L. TRIBE, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 12-11 (1978); Prettyman, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: Have We Seen the Last of
Prior Restraints on the Reporting ofJudicial Proceedings?, 20 ST. Louis L.J. 654 (1976); Sympo-
sium, Nebraska Press Assoc. . Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1977).
55. See, e.g., Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam);
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schul-
ingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301 (1974); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per
curiam); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See generally W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151-52 (1778) (prior restraints on publication invalid
at common law); Barnett, The Puzzle ofFrior Restraints, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 542-59 (1977);
Fenner & Koley, supra note 34, at 460-62; Note, Prior Restraint andthe Press Following The Penta-
gon Papers Cases-Is the Immunity Dissolying?, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 927 (1972).
56. Some commentators advocate a special right of access for the press because freedom of
the press has an express constitutional guarantee separate from freedom of speech. See note 7
supra-, Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731, 750-51,785-88 (1977); Com-
ment, The Right ofthe Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV.
166, 181 (1975) ("ifa freedom of the press, distinct from freedom of speech is guaranteed... then
it follows that in some situations the journalist may appropriately be granted special access to
information controlled by the government"). See also Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom ofthe
Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975).
Justice Stewart has recognized that "[ihf the Free Press guarantee meant no more than freedom of
expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy." Stewart, "Or Of The Press," 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 631, 633 (1975). Justice Stewart does not believe, however, that the free press guarantee gives
the press a special right of access.
The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in government. But the press
cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed. There is no
constitutional right to have access to particular government information .... The Con-
stitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.
Id. at 636.
57. Eg., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978); Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pel v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
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Conversely, other courts extend protection because they contend the
right to publish would be useless if the press did not have an opportu-
nity to gather news.58 The Supreme Court has recognized that "with-
out some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated. '59 Although the Court has indicated that some
protection is necessary,6" it has not explicitly found a first amendment
guarantee for the media's right of access.6'
1 (1965); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Tribune
Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414,442
P.2d 916 (1968); United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954). See
generally Fenner, supra note 34, at 487-88; Note, supra note 2, at 889 ("The first amendment
[does] . . .not ... require the removal of barrier to information").
58. E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727-28 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In
Branzburg Justice Stewart maintained that:
[A] corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news. The full flow of
information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee would be severely cur-
tailed if no protection whatever were afforded to the process by which news is assembled
and disseminated ...
News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire
information the right to publish would be impermissibly compromised.
Id. See Kovach v. Maddux, 238 F. Supp. 835, 839 (M.D. Tenn. 1965) ("Without the opportunity
to gather and obtain the news, the right to publish or to comment upon it, would be of little
value."). See also Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) ("Liberty of circulating is as essential
to [freedom of the press] as liberty of publishing; indeed without the circulation, the publication
would be of little value.").
59. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). In Branzburg the Court held that the first
amendment afforded no special protection to a reporter who refused to obey a grand jury sub-
poena. While recognizing that news gathering may qualify for some first amendment protection,
the Court also maintained that this first amendment protection did not give the press a right of
special access to information not available to the general public. Id. at 681-84. Six years later, in
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., the Court denied the press the right of access to prison facilities. 438
U.S. 1 (1978). The Court maintained that it had "never intimated a First Amendment guarantee
of a right of access to all sources of information within government control." Id. at 9. Conse-
quently, the Court held that the news media had no greater constitutional right of access to gov-
ernment controlled information than other members of the general public. Id. at 16. See
general Note, Trial Secrecy and the First4mendaent Right of Public Access to Judicial Proceed.
ings, 91 HARV. L. Rav. 1899 (1978). See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather
Information, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1505 (1974).
60. Judge Musmanno, in In re Mack, most clearly expressed the need for a right to gather:
Freedom of the press is not restricted to the operation of linotype machines and printing
presses. A rotary press needs raw material like a flour mill needs wheat. A print shop
without material to print would be as meaningless as a vineyard without grapes, an
orchard without trees, or a lawn without verdure.
Freedom of the press means freedom to gather news, write it, publish it, and circulate
it. When any one of these integral operations is interdicted, freedom of the press be-
comes a river without water.
386 Pa. 251, 273, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
61. Although most cases find no special right of access, commentators have supported a spe-
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A court's balancing of the first and sixth amendments implicates the
subsidiary issue of alternatives to closure.62 These alternatives often
ensure the defendant a fair trial without interfering with the function of
the press. At the trial stage the court has a battery of alternatives to
closure. Careful voir dire can effectively screen out prejudiced jurors.6 3
If all jurors in the pool appear prejudiced, the court can call a new
panel of prospective jurors. Under most state statutes the court can
move the trial to an adjoining county64 or can continue the trial until
the threat of prejudice abates. 65 The judge can instruct the jury against
cial right for the press. Without a special right of access, press publication is indirectly restrained.
See 53 TULANE L. REV. 629, 640 (1979) (After Houchins "restraints on press publication, which
have so long and steadfastly been guarded against, can now be accomplished by prohibiting the
• . press access"). Secondly, limited press access affects the public's right to know. See Note,
The Right of the Press to Gather Information Under the First Amendment, 12 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
357, 382 (1978) ("When the press is denied the right to gather information, it is the public which
remains ill-informed, contrary to the goal of a free flow of information... . ?). Thus, commenta-
tors have suggested a stringent test to be met before access is denied. See Note, supra note 34, at
110 (right of access should be limited only when necessary to further compelling state interest);
Comment, Newsgathering: Second-Class Right Among First Amendment Freedoms, 53 TEx. L.
REV. 1440 (1975) ("Courts should find a sufficiently compelling interest [to deny access] only when
press access would create a 'clear and present danger' either to national security or to the personal
safety of others.").
62. Ranney, Remedies for Prejudicial Publicity: .4 Brief Review, 21 VILL. L. REv. 819, 830
(1976); Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against Adverse Press Coverage, 13
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 23-29 (1971); Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial
Jury, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 349, 354-70 (1960); Note, TrialSecrecy andthe First Amendment Right of
Public Access to Judicial Proceedings, supra note 59, at 1916. Several courts advocate the use of
alternatives before issuing any order against the press. Eg., United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d
496, 508-09 (5th Cir. 1972); Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 182, 282 N.E.2d 306, 311, 331
N.Y.S.2d 407, 414-15 (1972); Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 468-69, 351
N.E.2d 127, 134-35 (1976).
63. Some commentators believe that properly performed voir dire, coupled with additional
peremptory challenges, is an effective method to dispel prejudice. See Babcock, Voir Dire: Pre-
serving "Its Wondeiful Power, " 27 STAN. L. REv. 545 (1975); Note, The Discretionary Power to
Grant Additional Peremptory Challenges in Highly Publicized Criminal Trials: Securing a Fair and
Impartial Jury, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 545 (1976); Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment
Right of Public Access to Judicial Proceedings, supra note 59. See also Beck v. Washington, 369
U.S. 541, 556 (1962). Much of the effectiveness of this method, however, depends on the skill of
the attorney. See Zeisel, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT OF THE ANNUAL CHIEF
JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 65, 76-92 (1977).
64. A change of venue can be effective only when the publicity is local and wiln not follow the
defendant to a new trial location. See Note, The Effcacy of a Change of Venue in Protecting a
Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925, 941-42 (1967) ("effectiveness
depends not upon its ability to prevent publicity ... but upon its ability to remove a defendant
from a poisoned atmosphere").
65. A continuance will be effective only if new publicity does not start up with the new trial.
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considering prejudicial information 66 or, if instructions are insufficient,
may sequester the jury throughout the trial.67 The trial judge may re-
quire the media and the public to follow certain rules in the courtroom.
The judge also may control the conduct of courtroom personnel and
officers s.6  The court's use of one of these alternatives normally leaves
inviolate both the first and sixth amendments.69
C. Scope of the Protection Afforded the Press: Pretrial V. Trial
Some courts have argued that even if the press has a first or sixth
amendment right of access to trials, this right does not extend to the
pretrial suppression hearing.7" While trials traditionally have been
See Note, Fair Trial and Free Press.- Preliminary Hearing-Gateway to Prejudice, 1973 LAW &
Soc. ORD. 903, 915 ("news media may simply rekindle the publicity").
66. Although jury instructions are often considered effective to combat prejudice, some pub-
licity is so pervasive that instructions become useless. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123, 135 (1968) (sometimes the risk is so great that "the jury will not, or cannot, follow instruc-
tions"); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe
naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all prac-
ticing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction"). But see note 104 infra.
67. Sequestration provides "the best method available to protect the conflicting rights of free-
dom of press and fair trial. . . ." Note, Sequestration: A Possible Solution to the Free Press-Fair
Trial.Dilemma, 23 AM. U.L. REv. 923, 955 (1974). Sequestration can cause problems, however.
It has been hypothesized that the unhappy juror who has been separated from his home,
business, and family for any amount of time might well feel resentment against the party
who has requested the procedure. This state of mind could, therefore, destroy the impar-
tiality of the jury, undermine the very purpose of the "lockup" procedure, and result in
an unfair trial.
Id at 934-35 (footnotes omitted).
68. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1969).
69. Subsequent release of a trial transcript also has been suggested as an alternative. Release
of the trial transcript supposedly minimizes any first amendment infringement. Although the
transcript provides a detailed account of the trial, many contend the transcript is a poor substitute
for actual courtroom presence of the press. In Kleindlenst v. Mandel the Court held that the public
has a right to have an alien who advocated communism enter the country, even though the public
already had access to his books and taped speeches. The Court maintained that it was "loath to
hold. . . that existence of other alternatives extinguishes altogether any constitutional interest on
the part of the appellees in this particular form of access." 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
In addition, delayed transcripts are of little value to the press because information not received
immediately probably will never be published. Brief of Petitioner at 20, Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). Petitioners in Gannett relied on Bridges v. California, in which the
Court maintained that "public interest is much more likely to be kindled by a controversial event
of the day than by a generalization, however penetrating, of the historian .... 314 U.S. 252,
268 (1941). Moreover, transcripts are cold records, lacking the tones, inflections and gestures that
are crucial to a complete understanding of the proceeding. The transcript minimizes the first
amendment infringement but may not be adequate protection for the freedom of the press in all
circumstances.
70. E.g., State v. Meek, 9 Ariz. App. 149, 450 P.2d 115, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969)
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open, the same is not true for pretrial proceedings.7 The Third Circuit
noted that the suppression hearing and the trial can have substantial
differences. The pretrial hearing does not determine the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant. The purpose of the pretrial hearing is to pro-
hibit inadmissible evidence from reaching the jury.7 2 Widespread
publicity of a pretrial proceeding can completely frustrate this pur-
pose.73 Conversely, other courts have found that since decisions made
in suppression hearings can be crucial to the outcome of the entire
criminal case, the policies supporting the open trial also support open-
ing pretrial proceedings.74 Approximately eighty-five percent of all
(pretrial proceeding is a screening procedure to stop unjustifiable claims); Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev.
414, 442 P.2d 916 (1968) (preliminary hearing is a "creature of statute"). See generall Note,
supra note 2, at 893-904.
71. "It must, of course, be remembered, that the principle of publicity only applies to the
actual trial of a case, not necessarily to the preliminary or prefatory stages of the proceedings
E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 75 (6th ed. 1967), quotedin Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale. 443 U.S. 368, 389 (1979). See Radin, supra note I, at 383-84.
72. United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 607 (3d Cir. 1969) (en banc).
Despite the differences, however, the court decided the suppression hearing was part of the guar-
anteed public trial. The court found that "[sluch a hearing, with conflicting credibility in issue
and factual findings of the judge the ultimate outcome, is in every respect equivalent to a trial
proceeding except that the jury necessarily must be excluded .... " Id. at 605.
73. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. _ 387 A.2d 425 (1978). The
court found that:
[T]he most damaging of all information from outside the courtroom comes from the pre-
trial suppression hearing. A trial court's ability to afford the accused a fair trial is sub-
stantially threatened where challenged inculpatory statements, testimony of the accused
bearing on such statements, or other information considered at the suppression hearing
becomes public knowledge prematurely.
Id at _ 387 A.2d at 436 (footnotes omitted).
74. Two circuit courts have expressly found that the policies underlying a public trial would
also support an open pretrial hearing. The third circuit, in United States v. Cianfrani, found that
"the need to make the trial accessible to unknown parties who might have important knowledge to
bring to light, the need to subject the judiciary to public scrutiny in the performance of its duties,
and the need to provide the 'appearance of justice' in order to foster confidence in the judicial
system" all support open pretrial proceedings. 573 F.2d 835, 850 (3d Cir. 1978). Eight years
earlier, the third circuit had maintined that:
The desirability of the public exposure of the claims and denials of coerced confessions,
the policy that judicial proceedings be under the scrutiny of the general public in order
to avoid judicial oppression and to discourage perjury, and the provision for the possibil-
ity that one who has valuable information might stray into the courtroom... are as
relevant to a... hearing as to a full trial.
United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 1969) (en banc). The second
circuit also has confronted the issue. In United States v. Clark the court held that "because of the
importance of providing an opportunity for the public to observe judicial proceedings at which the
conduct of enforcement officials is questioned, the right to public trial should extend to suppres-
sion hearings rather than permit such crucial steps in the criminal process to become associated
with secrecy." 475 F.2d 240, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1973).
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criminal proceedings never reach the trial stage.7" The disposition of
the motion to suppress "may require entry of a judgment of acquittal
for lack of other proof sufficient to convict."76 In many cases police
conduct is scrutinized only at the suppression hearing. Courts gener-
ally agree, therefore, that the pretrial suppression hearing is a crucial
step in the criminal justice process. The courts, however, have drawn
conflicting inferences from this proposition.
II. GANNETT Co. v DEPASQUALE
A. The Gannett Decision
Before Gannett, the press' right of access to criminal proceedings
remained unclear, despite extensive case law directly or indirectly
discussing the issue. The Supreme Court's decision in Gannett contrib-
uted little toward a final resolution of this crucial question. Only one
Justice joined Stewart's majority opinion. Three Justices wrote sepa-
rate opinions and the remaining four Justices dissented on sixth
amendment grounds. 77
In Gannett the trial court closed a pretrial suppression hearing 78 in
the murder trial of defendants Greathouse and Jones. The defendants
were charged with the murder of their fishing partner. The petitioner,
Gannett Co., published two Rochester, New York newspapers. Each
The new American Bar Association standards also support the proposition that the pretrial
suppression hearing is included within the sixth amendment public trial provision. See ABA,
supra note 24, Standard 8-3.2, at 15 n.1. Accord, United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. American Radiator and Standard San. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790,
794 (W.D. Pa.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 922 (1968). Cf United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721,
722 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949) (jury selection included within sixth amendment
public trial provision).
75. See generally National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES (appendix
A) (1978).
76. United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 1973).
77. Gannett was a 5-4 decision. Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Powell and Rehnquist wrote concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent, in
which Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined.
78. The defendant has a constitutional right to a fair hearing on motion to exclude an invol-
untary confession. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Involuntary confessions are excluded
because their procurement violated the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a discussion of the exclusionary rule,
which provides that all evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible, see
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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newspaper carried several articles on the search, capture, and arraign-
ment of defendants.79 At a suppression hearing defense attorneys re-
quested that the court exclude the public and press. The prosecutor did
not oppose the motion, and petitioner's reporter did not object. The
trial judge granted the motion. The next day, the reporter wrote a letter
asking for either a hearing on the suppression motion or access to the
transcript. The trial judge granted a hearing, but reserved the question
on access to the transcript.8 " At the hearing the trial judge ruled that
the press had a constitutional right of access, but that this right was
outweighed by a "reasonable probability of prejudice" to the defend-
ants' trial. The Supreme Court of New York vacated the order, t
which was reinstated by the New York Court of Appeals. 2 The United
States Supreme Court sustained the closure and held that members of
the public do not have a sixth amendment right to attend a pretrial
79. 443 U.S. at 371-74. On July 20 each paper carried its first story on Clapp's disappear-
ance. Each reported known details and stated the police's theory that Clapp had been shot in his
boat and his body dumped overboard. One paper mentioned Greathouse and Jones as compan-
ions who had accompanied Clapp on his boat. On July 22 the newspapers reported that police
had captured Greathouse and Jones. The stories also stated that the police theorized that Clapp
was shot with his own pistol, robbed, and thrown into the lake. On July 23 articles revealed that
Jones had waived extradition but that there were "legalities" involved in Greathouse's extradition
because he was a juvenile. On July 24 the Democrat & Chronicle reported that Greathouse had
led police to Clapp's revolver. On July 25 the Democrat & Chronicle reported that the two men
had been arraigned. On August 3 the papers reported the filing of indictments with background
details. On August 6 each paper carried the details of the arraignment, again reporting the accu-
sations. Id.
80. Id. at 375. Before the Appellate Division decision the defendants pleaded guilty to lesser
included crimes and the hearing transcripts were made available. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 43
N.Y.2d 370, 376 n. 1, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547 n. 1,401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 n.l (1977), aff'd, 443 U.S. 368
(1979). Despite the mootness of the issue, the Appellate Division, the New York Court of Ap-
peals, and the United States Supreme Court reached the substantive issue. See 443 U.S. at 376-77.
The Supreme Court found (1) the order closing a pretrial hearing too short in duration to allow
review and, (2) a reasonable expectation Gannett Co. would be subjected to similar suits. Id.
81. 55 A.D.2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976), rev'd, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), aff'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
82. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), aff'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). The
Gannett newspapers brought an original prohibition and mandamus challenging the closure order
on first, sixth, and fourteenth amendment grounds. 443 U.S. at 376. The Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, vacated the trial court's order because the order could not withstand the
clear and present danger test of Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See 55
A.D.2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976). See note 155 infra for a discussion of the clear and present
danger test. The New York Court of Appeals held that criminal trials are presumptively open to
the public, including the press, but that in this case the presumption was overcome by the danger
posed to the defendants' ability to receive a fair trial. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977).
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suppression hearing that can be asserted independently of the parties in
the litigation.83
The majority opinion distinguished between the trial and pretrial
stages of criminal proceedings. The Court found that the common-law
norm of open proceedings existed 'only at trial. It decided that the right
of public access to criminal trials should not extend to the pretrial sup-
pression hearing because the hearing poses special risks of unfairness to
the accused's right to a fair trial.84 Closure of the hearing is the "most
effective" method of ensuring that inadmissible prejudicial evidence
never reaches the attention of potential jurors. The Court suggested
that although less restrictive alternatives might suffice to assure impar-
tiality at trial, these methods would be ineffective at the pretrial stage.85
The Court held, therefore, that the public has no sixth amendment
right of access to a pretrial suppression hearing. 86
The dictum in the majority opinion is much broader than the hold-
ing. The Court suggested that the public has no sixth amendment right
of access to either the pretrial hearing or the actual trial 7 because the
sixth amendment assures only the accused's right to demand a public
trial. Because the parties to the litigation protect the societal interest in
public trials, members of the public have no independent sixth amend-
ment right to attend a criminal trial.88 The Court reserved decision on
whether the first amendment affords any right of access.89
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist concurred
with the majority but wrote separate opinions. Chief Justice Burger
interpreted the majority opinion to apply solely to pretrial proceedings.
The Chief Justice concluded that the public trial provision of the sixth
amendment does not extend to pretrial suppression hearings. 90 Justice
Powell agreed with the majority's interpretation of the sixth amend-
ment but decided the first amendment issue reserved by the majority.
He found the first amendment protects the press' interest in being pres-
83. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). The Court said that "[tihe Constitution nowhere mentions any right
of access to a criminal trial on the part of the public; its guarantee... is personal to the accused."
Id. at 379-80.
84. Id. at 378-79.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 384-91.
87. Id. at 383.
88. Id. at 384.
89. Id. at 392.
90. Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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ent at the pretrial hearing. 9' This interest is not absolute and must be
balanced against the accused's right to a fair trial. Justice Powell sug-
gested that the court give press representatives a hearing prior to any
possible exclusion from the courtroom. At this hearing the accused
would have the responsibility of showing that public access would
prejudice the trial. Members of the press would then demonstrate that
alternative procedures would adequately protect the defendant's
rights.92 Justice Powell concluded that the trial judge's actions com-
ported with this requirement.
Justice Rehnquist, concurring with the majority's sixth amendment
interpretation, found that the public has no enforceable right to attend
either the pretrial hearing or the actual trial. Justice Rehnquist's con-
currence extended the majority opinion by finding that the press has no
first amendment right of access. 93 The trial court, therefore, can close
the pretrial proceeding at defendant's request without any showing of
possible prejudice. 94
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, also reserved the first amendment issue
but found an enforceable sixth amendment public interest in attending
criminal proceedings. 95 An interpretation of other sixth amendment
provisions, 96 policy considerations, and the common law support an in-
91. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 401.
93. Id. at 403 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist previously recognized that lim-
iting the press' right of access is a form of censorship. He found that "censorship... as often as
not is exercised not merely by forbidding the printing of information in the possession of the
correspondent, but in denying him access to places where he might obtain such information."
Rehnquist, The First Amendment, Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12 GONz. L. REv. 1, 17
(1976).
94. 443 U.S. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 432-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The American Bar Association also supports the
view that there is a public interest in open trials. The standard states that:
The sixth amendment speaks in terms of the right of the accused to a public trial, but this
right does not belong solely to the accused to assert or forego as he or she desires. .....
The defendant's interest, primarily, is to ensure fair treatment in his or her particular
case. While the public's more generalized interest in open trials includes a concern for
justice to individual defendants, it goes beyond that. The transcendent reason for public
trials is to ensure efficiency, competence, and integrity in the overall operation of the
judicial system. Thus, the defendant's willingness to waive the right to a public trial in a
criminal case cannot be the deciding factor... It is just as important to the public to
guard against undue harshness or discrimination.
See ABA, supra note 30, Standard 8-3.2, at 15 (citations omitted).
96. 443 U.S. at 415-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun relied on Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972), and Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). See note 28 supra.
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dependent public right of access to ensure judicial integrity.97 Justice
Blackmun argued that individual members of the press and public
must have standing to assert their right of access, not only to trials, but
also to pretrial proceedings. Although pretrial proceedings were closed
routinely at common law, Justice Blackmun maintained that these
common-law hearings differed substantially from modem suppression
hearings.98 Justice Blackmun found that the pretrial suppression hear-
ing is procedurally similar to a trial; the hearing is a crucial,99 often
decisive, °° stage in the criminal proceeding. He proposed that the
public's right of access be balanced against the accused's right to a fair
trial. The accused has the burden of proving a "substantial pro-
bability" of prejudice, the lack of adequate alternatives, and the effec-
tiveness of closure.' 01 The trial judge did not follow these procedures,
and thus Justice Blackmun called for reversal.
B. Zmplications of Gannett
Gannett confused the issue of trial closure. The majority's analysis
left major points ambiguous. First, the majority did not explicitly clar-
ify whether the decision should apply only to pretrial proceedings or
whether it is equally applicable to actual trials.0 2 Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the majority opinion, expressed
conflicting views on this issue. 3 Chief Justice Burger limited the deci-
sion to pretrial proceedings; Justice Rehnquist maintained that the pre-
97. 443 U.S. at 412-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Reliance on history, however, is not al-
ways dispositive. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAINO 121 (1975);
Note, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 27
CALIF. L. REv. 157, 162-64 (1939); The Supreme Court-1978 Term, 93 HARM. L. REv. 62, 67-68
(1979). Justice Blackmun repudiated the historical approach to the sixth amendment as inconclu-
sive in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 850 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. 433 U.S. at 437 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun maintains that the pretrial
hearings closed at common law were probable cause hearings. He finds that "the modem suppres-
sion hearing, unknown at common law, is a type of objection to evidence such as took place at
common law... in open court during trial." Id. (emphasis in original).
99. It should be noted, however, that the grand jury and discovery processes also are crucial
to criminal justice administration, but both traditionally have been closed to the public. Seegener-
ally Note, supra note 65, at 906; 92 HARv. L. R1v. 1550 (1979).
100. Justice Blackmun noted that in 1976 every felony prosecution in Seneca County-where
this case took place---was terminated without a trial on the merits. 443 U.S. at 435 n.14 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 441-42.
102. See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 90, 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
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trial/trial distinction was superfluous to the decision. Secondly, the
Court did not formulate a standard of prejudice requisite for closure.
Although the reporting in Gannett was not "sensational," prejudice
could have arisen from publication of the confessions, 0 4 which were to
be examined at the pretrial suppression hearing. The majority did not
clarify whether a showing of prejudice is necessary before a trial judge
orders closure.10 5
Justice Rehnquist, in concurrence, maintained that no showing of
prejudice is necessary. He interpreted the majority to require only a
waiver by the accused, with the consent of the prosecutor and judge. 0 6
Gannett's majority, therefore, did not specify the standard a trial judge
should apply to order closure or when this standard should be imple-
mented.
The majority and dissent, in their interpretation of the sixth amend-
ment, agreed that there is a public interest in open criminal proceed-
ings.' 07 The majority held that this interest is unenforceable by
independent members of the public. The dissent argued that the ma-
jority's holding thereby recognized an accused's right to compel a
closed trial; a position that is inconsistent with the interpretation of
other sixth amendment provisions. The dissent's conclusion is inaccu-
rate, however, because it ignores the crucial role of prosecutor and
judge in a closure proceeding.'08 The majority does not allow defend-
ant to compel closure. The majority simply maintains that prosecutor
and judge can adequately protect the public interest. The majority ap-
parently requires consent by all parties to the litigation for any closure.
The majority also failed to deal with the first amendment issue. The
Court left unclear what, if any, protection that amendment affords.
The Court, however, implicitly established some guidelines for first
amendment protection. The Court found that the trial judge's actions
104. The police report of a confession by the suspect is the single most damaging element in a
news article. Simon, Does the Courtrs Decirion in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research
Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage 29 STAN. L. REv. 515, 520-27 (1977). Simon
found that jurors were influenced by what they read and that sensational stories had more impact
than sober accounts. Id. at 522. Simon's study also demonstrated, however, that jurors took the
judge's instructions very seriously and were able to ignore the prejudicial material they had read
and reach a verdict solely on the basis of what they heard at trial. Id. at 523.
105. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
107. See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
108. The majority addressed only the situation in which the prosecutor and judge concur in
the defendant's motion to close. 443 U.S. at 371.
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satisfied any first amendment requirement."° In Gannett the trial
judge held a hearing even though there was no objection when the clo-
sure motion was made. At this hearing the judge considered the nature
of the evidence to be exposed, the defendants' ages, and the extent of
previous publicity."1 ' He found a "reasonable probability" of
prejudice."' The prosecutor did not object to closure and the press did
not advance any alternatives. The Supreme Court implied that the de-
fendant must prove only a "reasonable probability" of prejudice for
closure, at least at the pretrial stage. There is no mention that the ac-
cused must show lack of alternatives or even effectiveness of closure.
The Gannett Court, however, did not explicitly address the first
amendment issue. Justices Powell and Rehnquist both expressly ad-
dressed this issue but reached opposite conclusions. Justice Powell
found that the press had a first amendment right of access to pretrial
proceedings but that the trial judge's actions comported with the re-
quirement."t 2 Conversely, Justice Rehnquist found no first amendment
right of access. He concluded that the court need advance no reason to
grant a closure motion because the public has no enforceable sixth or
first amendment right of access." 3
109. Id. at 391-93.
110. Id. at 402 (Powell, J., concurring).
111. ld. at 393.
112. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
113. The Gannett decision created widespread confusion in the press and in the courts. Sev-
eral courts have addressed the issue of closure since Gannett. See, e.g., United States v. Powers,
477 F. Supp. 497,499 (S.D. Iowa 1979) (adopted clear and present danger test for trial closure, but
found it unnecessary to retroactively determine whether defendant had sustained his burden);
Shires v. Britt, - Ark. _ , 589 S.W.2d 18,19 (1979) (closure of pretrial hearing prohibited by
state statute which provides "sitting of every court shall be public"); Connecticut v. Castonguay, 5
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1628 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 1979) (motion to close all pretrial proceed-
ings denied because too broad); Gannett Pac. Corp. v. Richardson, 59 Hawaii 224, 233, 580 P.2d
49, 56 (1978) (closure of pretrial probable cause hearing allowed when judge determines there is a
substantial likelihood evidence introduced at the hearing will interfere with the defendant's right
to a fair trial); Keene Publishing Corp. v. Superior Court, - N.H. __ 406 A.2d 137, 138 (1979)
(dicta that pretrial hearing can be closed only on a showing of clear and present danger to the
defendant's trial); Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 443, 399
N.E.2d 518. 525, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 637-38 (1979) (ordinary competency hearing does not generate
the type of adverse publicity that would enable judge to close the hearing to protect the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial); Merola v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 985, 987, 393 N.E.2d 1038, 1039, 419 N.Y.S.2d
965, 966 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3055 (1980) (upheld closure of pretrial suppression hearing
in murder prosecution of thirteen-year-old juvenile); New York v. Biggs, 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
1518, 1523-24 (N.Y. Suffolk County Ct. Aug. 15, 1979) (insufficient showing of possible prejudice
to close pretrial hearing in murder prosecution); Rapid City Journal Co. v. Brandenburg, - SD.
- - 286 N.W.2d 125, 126 (1979) (parties objecting to closure must be allowed hearing before
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III. RICHMOND NEWSPA4PERS, INC. V VIRGINIA
A. The Richmond Decision
In Richmond ' 4 the trial judge closed the two day murder trial of
John Paul Stevenson. The defendant moved for a closed trial because
the defense did not "want any information being shuffled back and
forth.""15 The prosecution made no objection and the trial judge found
that the state closure statute gave him-specific power to close the court-
room. Two reporters from Richmond Newspapers, Inc., ousted from
the proceedings, sought a hearing. The trial court ruled that because
three previous attempts to try the defendant had failed, every step
should be taken to assure that defendant did not have his rights
abridged." 6 The court upheld the closure motion and found the de-
fendant not guilty of murder. 1 7
In a seven to one decision the Supreme Court held that the right of
the press and the public to attend criminal trials is guaranteed by the
first and fourteenth amendments."" Although the Court explicitly re-
fused to overrule Gannett, the intended scope of the Richmond ruling is
uncertain because there are seven separate opinions without a majority
opinion." 19
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, found that Gannett held
only that the sixth amendment does not guarantee the public a right of
access to pretrial suppression hearings.' 20 Chief Justice Burger, how-
ever, did not find a sixth amendment right of access to actual trials, but,
closure); Rapid City Journal Co. v. Tice, - S.D. _ 283 N.W.2d 563, 567 (1979) (closure of
voir dire upheld because "defendant's right to a fair trial will be jeopardized if [closure] motion
denied"); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 326 (Wyo. 1979) (adopted clear and present danger
test for closure of bail hearing).
114. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
115. Brief for Appellants at 5, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
116. Brief for Appellants at 7-8, id.
117. The court released a one page order that indicated that the prosecution's evidence was
excluded. Because the transcript was not released, it is unknown why the evidence was inadmissi-
ble. Brief for Appellants at 8-9, id.
118. 100 S. Ct. at 2829.
119. Only Justices White and Stevens joined in Burger's opinion. 100 S. Ct. at 2818.
120. One of the media-appellant's arguments focused on the pretrial-trial distinction. The
appellant contended that Gannett did not address the issue of trial closure. The appellant asserted
that pretrial and trial proceedings are "poles apart." "The aim of the [suppression hearing] is to
keep inadmissible informationftom the jury; [the aim of the trial is] to present admissible informa-
tion to the jury-and to the community that the jury represents." Brief for Appellants at 11,
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). Thus, the appellant concluded
that it is only in the context of the pretrial suppression hearing that openness and fairness are in
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instead, based his decision solely on the first amendment. He reviewed
the history of the trial process and concluded that "a presumption of
openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial."'' Chief Jus-
tice Burger found that an open proceeding not only is educative, but
also enhances the integrity and quality of the trial process and provides
a significant "community therapeutic value."' 22 He concluded that
without the appearance of justice, public confidence in the judicial sys-
tem is undermined, spawning a public reaction that the "system at best
has failed and at worst has been corrupted."'123
Chief Justice Burger found that the first amendment, in conjunction
with the fourteenth amendment, explicitly prohibits abridgment of
freedom of speech or press. These expressly guaranteed freedoms
share a common purpose of assuring freedom of communication.
Thus, he held that the first and fourteenth amendments implicitly pro-
hibit trial closure on the unopposed request of a defendant when there
is no evidence that defendant's right to a fair trial requires closure. 24
Chief Justice Burger found that the trial judge in Richmond did not
consider any alternatives to closure. Distinguishing the Gannett pre-
trial proceeding, he stated that at trial there are "tested alternatives to
satisfy the constitutional demands of fairness."'' 2 5 He suggested exclud-
ing witnesses from the courtroom or sequestering the jury. Thus, the
first and fourteenth amendments prohibited trial closure because rea-
sonable alternatives were available to protect the defendant's right to a
fair trial.
Justice White agreed with Chief Justice Burger's first amendment
analysis. Justice White said that the Richmond decision was unneces-
sary, however, because the sixth amendment precluded public exclu-
sion from criminal proceedings except in narrowly defined circum-
stances. 126 Justice Stevens, while joining the Chief Justice's opinion,
tension. At trial, alternatives to closure will almost inevitably suffice, and therefore, closure of a
criminal trial is seldom justified.
121. 100 S. Ct. at 2825.
122. Id. at 2824. The Court stated that "[e]ven without such experts to frame the concept in
words, people sensed from experience and observation that, especially in the administration of
justice, the means used to achieve justice must have the support derived from public acceptance of
both the process and its results." Id.
123. Id. at 2825.
124. Id. at 2829.
125. Id. at 2830. For a further discussion of alternatives, see notes 68-72 supra.
126. 100 S. Ct. at 2830.
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would extend first amendment protection to places not customarily
public.' 27 Justice Stevens concluded that the first amendment guaran-
tees the public and press a right of access not only to criminal trials, but
also to all government operations. 2
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred, finding the
Virginia statute unconstitutional. 29  Justice Brennan found that the
valid purposes served by an open trial tipped the balance strongly to-
ward public access.' 30 Because the statute gave the judge full discretion
to close a trial, Justice Brennan did not decide what countervailing in-
terests, if any, would compel trial closure.
Justice Stewart, also concurring, asserted that the Court in Gannett
had held that the sixth amendment does not protect public access to
pretrial proceedings or actual trials.' 3 ' Thus, he did not limit the Gan-
nett holding strictly to pretrial stages of a proceeding. Additionally, he
emphasized that the Richmond decision applied only to actual trials.132
Thus, Justice Stewart inferred that there may be no first amendment
protection at the pretrial stage, and that Richmond's application to ac-
tual trials was subject to reasonable limitations.
Justice Blackmun, who wrote the dissent in Gannett, found that the
Richmond Court clarified Gannett by demonstrating that Gannett ap-
plied only to pretrial proceedings. 33 Thus, he read Gannett to hold
only that there is no sixth amendment right of public access to a pre-
trial suppression hearing--an interpretation directly opposed to Justice
Stewart's. Justice Blackmun stated that Gannett was an erroneous deci-
sion, and that the first amendment public right of access to trials is
"troublesome." He looked to the first amendment to conclude finally
127. Id. at 2831. In a previous decision, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), Justice
Stevens advocated that public access to prisons is guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. See note 59 supra.
128. 100 S. Ct. at 2831.
129. Id. at 2839. VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (1975) provides in part: "In the trial of all criminal
cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude
from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that
the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated."
130. 100 S. Ct. at 2832 (Brennan, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 2839 (Stewart, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 2841 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackmun stated that it was gratifying "to see the
Court wash away at least some of the graffiti that marred the prevailing opinions in Gannett. No
less than 12 times in the primary opinion in that case, the court (albeit in what seems now to have
become clear dicta) observed that its Sixth Amendment closure ruling applied to the trial itself."
Id.
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that the first amendment did provide some measure of protection and
that the trial judge in Richmond clearly abridged the first amendment
interests of the public. 134
Justice Rehnquist authored the only dissent. Relying on his Gannett
opinion, he rejected any first or sixth amendment public right of access
to a pretrial or trial proceeding.135 Additionally, he concluded that the
Supreme Court has no power to review closure orders of state trial
judges.
B. Implications of Richmond
The ambiguities in Richmond may intensify rather than resolve the
fair trial-free press conflict. The Court failed to clarify whether Gan-
nett's sixth amendment analysis applied only to pretrial suppression
hearings or was equally applicable to actual trials. Chief Justice Bur-
ger's opinion, as well as the opinion of Justice Blackmun, stressed that
Gannett applied only to pretrial proceedings.' 36 Conversely, the opin-
ion of Justice Stewart indicated that Gannett's analysis extended to ac-
tual trials.137 It is unclear, therefore, whether a sixth amendment right
of public access to trials exists.
The first amendment analysis is equally ambiguous. The Court con-
cluded that a first amendment right of access to trials did exist. The
Court did not resolve, however, whether this first amendment right ex-
tended to the pretrial stage of a trial.138 Thus, the Court failed to ad-
dress the protection that a Gannett proceeding requires. Recognition of
a first amendment right of access poses certain dangers. 139 A right of
access to all government institutions could severely obstruct the admin-
istration of justice. Adoption of a first amendment right of access ap-
plies only to institutions traditionally open to the public could alleviate
this danger. This would provide a public right of access for trials,
134. Id. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 2843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2821, 2832.
137. Id. at 2839 (Stewart, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 2830, n.18.
139. One commentator has suggested that the closure problem could better be solved by exer-
cise of the Supreme Court's supervisory power over federal courts. The Court would be able to
invoke a strict standard without straining the language of the sixth amendment or creating a first
amendment right that would be difficult to limit. The Supreme Court-1978 Term, supra note 97.
This solution would not solve cases, such as Gannett, that come to the Supreme Court from the
state court. One could only hope the state courts would follow the Supreme Court's example in
closure cases.
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which are traditionally open events,14 but not for pretrial suppression
hearings, which are often closed. 14  The Court emphasized that the
trial courtroom was a public place, which indicates that areas tradition-
ally closed to the public might not receive equal, or any, first amend-
ment protection.142 Justice Stevens, however, advocated extending this
first amendment protection to private places, such as prisons.143 Thus,
the scope of the first amendment right of access remains unclear.
The Court also did not formulate an appropriate standard for clo-
sure. Clearly the Court intended some balancing between defendant's
right to a fair trial and the public's right of access to trials. No first
amendment right of access is absolute. Courts must strike a balance
between the first amendment right of access and the sixth amendment
right to a fair trial. In Richmond the Justices weighed several standards
in this balance.'" Chief Justice Burger found that the courtroom must
remain open "absent an overriding interest articulated in findings."'' 45
Justice Stewart found that the first amendment right of access was sub-
ject to "reasonable limitations."'1 6 Justice White found that closure
was acceptable only in "narrowly defined circumstances."' 47 Justice
140. See note 9 supra.
141. See note 71 supra.
142. 100 S. Ct. at 2828.
143. Id. at 283 1.
144. In August of 1978 the American Bar Association changed its standard for closure of
pretrial proceedings, adopting the clear and present danger test. The new standard provides:
The presiding officer may close a preliminary hearing ... including a motion to sup-
press... if. (i) the dissemination of information from the pretrial proceeding and its
record would create a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and (ii) the
prejudicial effect of such information on trial fairness cannot be avoided by any reason-
able alternative means.
ABA, supra note 24, Standard 8-3.2. The standard does not list possible alternatives, but the
commentary suggests continuance, severance, change of venue, change of venire, intensive voir
dire, and jury instructions. Id. The predecessor to this standard advocated a less strenuous test
for closure. Standard 3.1 provided:
In any preliminary hearing. . . including a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant
may move that all or part of the hearing be held in chambers or otherwise closed to the
public, including representatives of the news media, on the ground that dissemination of
evidence or argument adduced at the hearing may disclose matters that will be inadmis-
sible in evidence at the trial and is therefore likely to interfere with his right to a fair trial
by an impartial jury. The motion shall be granted unless the presiding officer determines
that there is no substantial likelihood of such interference.
ABA ADVISORY CoMM=siTE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FRE PREss, Project on Standardsror Criminal
Justice, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press (1968 draft).
145. 100 S. Ct. at 2830.
146. Id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 2830 (White, J., concurring).
Washington University Open Scholarship
972 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Blackmun decided only that "the First Amendment must provide some
measure of protection."148 Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall did
not balance first and sixth amendment interests because in Richmond
the lower court asserted no justification for closure.149 Justice Rehn-
quist did not address the issue because he continued to advocate, as he
had in Gannett, that no first amendment right of public access exists.'5 0
Thus, the Justices did not agree on any standard for closure, which
leaves trial judges once again to wrestle with this perplexing problem
without Court guidance.
Although closure is similar to a prior restraint, the Supreme Court
did not advocate the "clear and present danger" test the Court has
adopted for prior restraints.' Arguably, court closure raises problems
similar to those inherent in prior restraints. Before a first amendment
right to gather information was recognized, some commentators pre-
dicted that the closed courtroom would become a "serious backdoor
threat to first amendment interests."'152 The closed trial "prevents com-
munication from occurring at all,"' 53 and potentially does more dam-
age than a prior restraint. Under one view, therefore, court closure can
be viewed as an indirect prior restraint 54 that prevents free exercise of
guaranteed first amendment rights.
There is a critical distinction, however, that makes closure a more
tolerable infringement of the first amendment than prior restraints.
When a court issues a prior restraint, the press is forbidden to print any
information about the trial, regardless of where or how it obtains this
information. When the court closes a trial, it denies the press one
source of information. The press is free to publish any news that it
gathers from alternative sources.
148. Id. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 2831, 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 2844 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
151. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (prior restraint order issued only
when intense and pervasive publicity presenting a clear danger that defendant's right to a fair trial
could be impinged).
152. STAFF OF THE SuBcOMMITTEE ON CONsTrrTUTONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMIT-
TEE ON THE JUDIcIARy, REPORT ON FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAI, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
See also Fenner & Koley, supra note 34, at 443; Franklin, UntestedAssumptions and Unanswered
Questions, 29 STAN. L. REv. 387, 391 (1977); Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion
of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 471-72 (1977); Schmidt & Volner,
Nebraska Press Association: An Open or Shut Decision?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 529, 530 (1977).
153. See Fenner & Koley, supra note 34, at 464.
154. Id. at 475.
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Justice Blackmun in Gannett suggested one test to balance the inter-
ests of a defendant and those of the public. Under this test the defend-
ant must prove, (1) a substantial probability of irreparable damage to a
fair trial, (2) the lack of alternatives, and (3) a substantial probability
that closure will be effective. 5' In addition, the press must have an
opportunity to be heard on the closure motion at an appropriate hear-
ing. 1
56
The availability of alternatives plays an important role in this test.
In Richmond Chief Justice Burger found that the exclusion of witnesses
from the courtroom or the sequestration of the jury would be effective
alternatives. 57 Even though these alternatives present difficulties for
the trial court, the court found them manageable. The Court gave no
further indication of other alternatives or when an alternative would be
unmanageable.
In Richmond sequestration of the jury was a logical alternative to
closure. The anticipated length of the trial was only two days. Thus,
jurors would suffer the inconvenience of sequestration for only one
night. This inconvenience obviously was not sufficient to sacrifice ei-
ther the accused's sixth amendment right to a fair trial or the first
amendment freedom of the press.' 58
V. CONCLUSION
Although Richmond is a landmark decision in the first amendment
area, it certainly has not resolved the fair trial-free press dilemma. The
resolution of a courtroom closure case will remain a perplexing prob-
155. Many commentators believe that it is impossible for the defendant to meet the burden of
the clear and present danger test. See Shellow, The Voice of the Press. Erwin Charles Simants"
Efforts to Secure a Fair Trial, 29 STAN. L. REv. 477, 484 (1977) (unfair trials may be the "price we
pay for a free press and a free society"); Note, supra note 19, at 1330 (prior restraints "unavailable
even in those few cases which require it"); The Supreme Court-1978 Term, supra note 97, at 72
(clear and present danger test "would rarely allow closure and would therefore inadequately pro-
tect the defendant's right to a fair trial").
156. Id.
157. 443 U.S. at 441-43.
158. In lengthier, more complex cases, the administration of alternatives could place a heavy
burden on the trial judge. The trial judge also must consider that certain alternatives may endan-
ger defendant's interests. The Court has ruled that "even though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamen-
tal personal liberties when the end can be narrowly achieved." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960).
Jury sequestration is not always adequate because it can arouse jury hostility toward the de-
fendant. In addition, fewer alternatives are available at pretrial proceedings than at trial.
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lem for trial judges. Gannett implies that there is no public right to
attend criminal pretrial proceedings guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment. In Richmond the Court chose not to decide whether its sixth
amendment analysis also applies to actual trial proceedings.
In addition to refusing to clarify its position on the sixth amendment,
the Richmond Court failed to enunciate adequately its position on the
first amendment. Richmond holds that the first and fourteenth amend-
ments implicitly prohibit the closure of a criminal trial on defendant's
unopposed request when there is no evidence that closure will protect
the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Two issues remain unresolved, however, after Richmond and Gan-
nett. First, the Richmond Court failed to formulate an appropriate
standard for closure. It is unclear how the Court will balance first
amendment protection against the accused's sixth amendment right to a
fair trial. A court certainly will require the defendant to demonstrate
some danger of prejudice to his right to a fair trial before granting clo-
sure. The degree of danger required, however, is difficult to predict.
Additionally, the exact role that alternatives to closure will play in this
balancing process remains unresolved.
Secondly, the Richmond Court failed to apply its analysis to a Gan-
nett situation. Thus, it is unclear whether the first amendment prevents
closure of criminal pretrial proceedings. Approximately eighty-five
percent of all criminal cases are resolved before trial. Thus, if neither
the first nor the sixth amendments afford any protection for pretrial
proceedings, many of the courtrooms closed after Gannett may not be
opened by Richmond. Clearly, the Court should resolve these issues to
ensure full constitutional protection for defendant's fair trial rights and
for freedom of the press.
Linda J Douglas
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